{"id":61316,"date":"2025-06-05T14:49:40","date_gmt":"2025-06-05T12:49:40","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/bpcc.org.pl\/?p=61316"},"modified":"2025-06-05T14:49:40","modified_gmt":"2025-06-05T12:49:40","slug":"macroeconomic-overview-end-may-2025","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/dev2.bpcc.org.pl\/pl\/macroeconomic-overview-end-may-2025\/","title":{"rendered":"Macroeconomic overview, end-May 2025"},"content":{"rendered":"

The big picture for UK and foreign investors interested in Poland. Key macroeconomic indicators updated monthly.\u00a0 [GUS = G\u0142\u00f3wny Urz\u0105d Statistyczny \u2013 Statistics Poland]<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
CPI inflation<\/strong><\/td>\n(y\/y, May 25, GUS, preliminary)<\/td>\n4.1%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Unemployment<\/strong><\/td>\n(claimant rate Apr 25, GUS)<\/td>\n5.2%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Unemployment<\/strong><\/td>\n(econ. inactive, Eurostat, Apr 25)<\/td>\n3.2%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
GDP growth 2024<\/strong><\/td>\n(y\/y GUS)<\/td>\n2.9%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
GDP growth Q1 2025 <\/strong><\/td>\n(y\/y GUS, first estimate)<\/td>\n3.2%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
GDP growth 2025 forecast<\/strong><\/td>\n(PKO Bank Polski, May 25)<\/td>\n3.3%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Retail sales<\/strong><\/td>\n(y\/y to Apr 25, GUS)<\/td>\n7.6%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Export of goods<\/strong><\/td>\n(2024, down 0.8% on 2023, GUS)<\/td>\n\u20ac350.4 billion<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Import of goods<\/strong><\/td>\n(2024, up 1.9% on 2023, GUS)<\/td>\n\u20ac349.7 billion<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Average wages (private sector, monthly, gross)<\/strong><\/td>\n(GUS, Apr 25 \u2013 up 9.3% y-o-y)<\/td>\n9,045 PLN
\n(=\u20ac2,130 \/ \u00a31,790)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Statutory Minimum Wage (full-time, monthly, gross)<\/strong><\/td>\n(from Jan 25; up 10.0% from Jan 24)<\/td>\n4,666 PLN
\n(=\u20ac1,097 \/ \u00a3925)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
NBP reference rate<\/strong><\/td>\n(last change on 8 May 2025,
\n50 basis-point cut)<\/td>\n		5.25%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Industrial output<\/strong><\/td>\n(year-on-year, Apr \u00a025, GUS)<\/td>\n1.2%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Construction output<\/strong><\/td>\n(year-on-year, Apr \u00a025, GUS)<\/td>\n-4.2%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
PLN as of 30 May, NBP rate<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a31 = 5.0552; \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u20ac1 = 4.2507; \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0$1 = 3.75<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
PMI<\/strong><\/td>\nMay 25: 47.1 (down from 50.2 in Apr 25)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

 <\/p>\n

Commentary<\/strong><\/p>\n

How\u2019s Poland\u2019s economy likely to fare by the end of 2025? As of the end of May, forecasts have settled into a range around 3.3%, suggesting strong growth compared to Western European economies.<\/p>\n

The economy showed strong signs of recovery in the beginning of Q2, with strong growth in wages and retail sales, with industrial output returning to positive territory \u2014 all exceeding expectations. Growth is projected to remain strong for the full year, driven by rising consumer spending, public- and private-sector investment, and EU-funded industrial modernisation in defence and green energy.<\/p>\n

Poland\u2019s economy did better than expected last year, with GDP growing by 2.9%. Inflation peaked at 5.0% in March, dipping by May to 4.1%. The National Bank of Poland responded to the faster-than-expected fall in inflation by lower borrowing costs (down 50 basis points to 5.25% on 8 May).<\/p>\n

Wage inflation remains stubbornly high; recruitment and retention is a major issue for employers. However, rising real wages are making their way through to retail sales.<\/p>\n

Manufacturing industry, however, has returned to a negative PMI reading after three months with a score above 50. The EU\u2019s decision to massively boost spending on military production and green energy infrastructure has raised manufacturers\u2019 spirits.<\/p>\n

Unemployment is stable; by Eurostat\u2019s economic inactivity-based data it is 3.2% whilst the Polish government\u2019s data based on registered unemployment shows 5.2% in April. Overall productivity continues to grow much faster than in the Eurozone.<\/p>\n

Looking back at the past 20 years since Poland joined the EU, it is clear that Polish workers have done well over that time. Whilst inflation had doubled prices, wages have increased three-fold, representing an increase in spending power of over 50%. Contrast this situation with the UK, where real wages have not budged in 20 years.<\/p>\n

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 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Core inflation has already started falling, so by the second half of this year, the central bank should be able to continue to lower base rates (assuming no black-swan events).<\/p>\n

The politically driven minimum wage is seen as problematic by manufacturers with large blue-collar workforces. From 1 January 2025, the statutory minimum wage rose by a further 8.5% from 4,300z\u0142 a month gross to 4,666z\u0142 (from 1 July 2024), and up 10.0% from the 4,242z\u0142 it was on 1 January 2024, while inflation has risen by around 5%.<\/p>\n

Although the Polish government, formed in autumn 2023, is seen as more business-friendly in its rhetoric, it is still difficult to point to specific improvements in the overall business environment. Victory of a presidential candidate from the opposition bloc suggests that ongoing legislative stasis is more than likely to continue, raising political uncertainty.<\/p>\n

Questions facing investors in Poland centre on the future of Russian hostilities in Ukraine and the possibility of a ceasefire. An end to the shooting war would signal a major reconstruction boom in Ukraine, with Poland a natural logistics platform and partner for that process. Another area of uncertainty is the state of Western Europe\u2019s \u2013 specifically Germany\u2019s \u2013 economic prospects, as Poland\u2019s manufacturing depends heavily on German customers, in a supply chain that has a significant exposure to the US market.<\/p>\n

The US is Poland\u2019s seventh-largest export market and third-largest import source; last year, Poland had a $5.9 billion deficit in trade in goods with the US. How this will ultimately be affected by the unpredictable tariff war is as yet incalculable.<\/p>\n

Overall trade in goods for the first half of 2024 show Poland with a tiny surplus of \u20ac4.6 billion; the value of goods exported falling faster than that of imports. In 2024, the UK was Poland\u2019s only Top Four export market to have grown both in value (up by 5.5%) and in terms of its share in the overall structure of Polish exports of goods (up from 5.0% to 5.3%); this trend continued into March 2025.<\/p>\n

Demographics and the labour market<\/strong><\/p>\n

Unemployment is likely to stay near record low levels; while firms are less likely to be recruiting this year, fewer young Poles will be entering the labour market. Wage pressure is likely to continue as retention of skilled employees continues to be a big worry for firms. Poland\u2019s largest age cohort, born in 1983, reaches the age of 42 this year (around 700,000 people); compare this demographic high-water mark to the number of 22-year-olds, born in 2003 \u2013 a mere 350,000. The number of labour-market entrants will continue to fall (fewer than 300,000 Poles were born in 2024).<\/p>\n

Poland\u2019s unemployment is lowest in the cities and highest in rural areas. More than half of the long-term unemployed live in villages. Big disparities exist between cities where unemployment is extremely low (Katowice 1.2%, Pozna\u0144 1.2%, Warsaw 1.5%, Wroc\u0142aw 1.8%, Krak\u00f3w 2.2%, and Gda\u0144sk 2.7%), and small provincial towns where it remains in double digits. Szyd\u0142owiec district, 120km south of Warsaw, also in Mazowsze province, holds the record for Poland at 21.9%. Nearby Radom, a city of 200,000 people, also has high unemployment at 9.7%. New investors might wish to consider university cities such as Szczecin (3.6%), \u0141\u00f3d\u017a (4.8%), Rzesz\u00f3w (4.1%), Lublin (4.3%) or Kielce (4.9%). All data from April 2025.<\/p>\n

Unemployment has risen since March in \u0141\u00f3d\u017a (up by 0.3 percentage points) Warsaw and Kielce (up by 0.1 percentage point), and has fallen in Szczecin (down by 0.1 percentage points). In Wroc\u0142aw, Krak\u00f3w, Katowice, Pozna\u0144, Kielce, Rzesz\u00f3w and Gda\u0144sk it has remained stable.<\/p>\n

The zloty<\/strong><\/p>\n

Although Poland notionally signed up to join the eurozone as part of its EU Accession Treaty, there was no mention of when, or at what rate. To do so, Poland must alter its constitution, which needs a two-thirds parliamentary majority. So Poland continues to linger on the fringes of the EU\u2019s core \u2013 and \u2013 importantly for its manufactured exports \u2013 it can control the competitiveness of its currency. The Brexit referendum resulted in a dramatic fall in value of the pound against the zloty. From June to October 2016, the pound fell from 5.60z\u0142 to 4.80z\u0142, a 14% drop. Since then, it has recovered; fluctuations result more from political turbulence than macroeconomic fundamentals. The outcome of the presidential election on 1 June nudged the value of the z\u0142oty downward slightly, moving it from 5.00z\u0142 toward 5.07z\u0142 to the pound.<\/p>\n

A weaker zloty makes Polish exports more competitive as well as boosting Poland\u2019s attractiveness as a location for inbound foreign direct investment.<\/p>\n

UK-Polish trade<\/strong><\/p>\n

On the surface, Brexit has not hampered trade between Poland and the UK, with 2024 witnessing yet another record in the value of goods and services traded between the two economies. However, UK exports to Poland now include significant sales of fossil fuels substituting those Poland used to buy from Russia. Polish export growth to the UK mainly comes from its larger exporters successfully replacing goods from Western European SMEs which no longer trade with the UK because of frictions arising due to the UK\u2019s departure from the single European market and Customs Union. These have made it much harder for small business to trade profitably with a third country.<\/p>\n

Links:<\/strong><\/p>\n

GUS<\/a> (Statistics Poland) English-language pages
\nCentral Bank of Poland<\/a> English-language pages
\nEurostat<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The big picture for UK and foreign investors interested in Poland. Key macroeconomic indicators updated monthly.\u00a0 [GUS = G\u0142\u00f3wny Urz\u0105d Statistyczny \u2013 Statistics Poland] CPI inflation (y\/y, May 25, GUS, preliminary) 4.1% Unemployment (claimant rate Apr 25, GUS) 5.2% Unemployment (econ. inactive, Eurostat, Apr 25) 3.2% GDP growth 2024 (y\/y GUS) 2.9% GDP growth Q1 […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":24251,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_et_pb_use_builder":"","_et_pb_old_content":"","_et_gb_content_width":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[57,56],"tags":[],"ppma_author":[308],"class_list":["post-61316","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-publications","category-news","author-bpcc_en","et-has-post-format-content","et_post_format-et-post-format-standard"],"acf":[],"authors":[{"term_id":308,"user_id":0,"is_guest":1,"slug":"bpcc_en","display_name":"British Polish Chamber of Commerce","avatar_url":{"url":"https:\/\/dev2.bpcc.org.pl\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/Vertical_logotype_red_crown_transparent.png","url2x":"https:\/\/dev2.bpcc.org.pl\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/Vertical_logotype_red_crown_transparent.png"},"first_name":"","last_name":"","user_url":"","description":"Since 1992, the British-Polish Chamber of Commerce has been working on behalf of its member companies in two areas - business development and the business environment. By offering extensive networking opportunities - at events and through its digital media - the BPCC helps to connect companies for mutual tangible benefits. \r\n\r\nThe BPCC is the first point of contact for all investors who see Poland as a convenient location to start an investment. "}],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/dev2.bpcc.org.pl\/pl\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/61316","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/dev2.bpcc.org.pl\/pl\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/dev2.bpcc.org.pl\/pl\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/dev2.bpcc.org.pl\/pl\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/dev2.bpcc.org.pl\/pl\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=61316"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/dev2.bpcc.org.pl\/pl\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/61316\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":61322,"href":"https:\/\/dev2.bpcc.org.pl\/pl\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/61316\/revisions\/61322"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/dev2.bpcc.org.pl\/pl\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/24251"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/dev2.bpcc.org.pl\/pl\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=61316"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/dev2.bpcc.org.pl\/pl\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=61316"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/dev2.bpcc.org.pl\/pl\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=61316"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/dev2.bpcc.org.pl\/pl\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/ppma_author?post=61316"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}